State v. Svelmoe Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43181 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-29-2015
State v. Svelmoe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43181
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Svelmoe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43181" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5765.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5765













) _____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
TED S. TOLLEFSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 




JAY W. LOGSDON 
Deputy Public Defender 
Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office 
400 Northwest Blvd. 
P. 0. Box 9000 





OCT 2 9 2015 
Saj),eme -~.~ ·n•-o 
Entered on ATS by 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO COPY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
TROY MILES SVELMOE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) No. 43181 
) 





) _____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
TED S. TOLLEFSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 




JAY W. LOGSDON 
Deputy Public Defender 
Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office 
400 Northwest Blvd. 
P. 0. Box 9000 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 5 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
I. Svelmoe Has Failed To Show The District 
Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
To Dismiss The Refiled Felony ....................................................... 6 
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 6 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 7 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When 
It Denied Svelmoe's Motion To Dismiss ............................... 8 
1. The Felony Complaint Was Not 
Refiled For The Purpose Of 
Harassment, Delay or 
Forum-Shopping; Therefore 
The Refiling Did Not Violate 
Due Process .............................................................. 8 
2. Res Judicata Is Inapplicable And 
Did Not Bar The State From Refiling 
The Complaint .......................................................... 11 
II. Svelmoe Failed To Show the District Court 
Erred When It Denied His Motion In Limine .................................. 13 
A. Introduction ......................................................................... 13 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................ 14 
C. The District Court And The Appellate 
Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction In 
This Criminal Case To Consider 
Svelmoe's Challenge To The Validity 
Of The 2013 SOPs ............................................................. 15 
D. Even If The 2013 SOPs Are Void, 
Svelmoe Has Failed To Show The 
District Court Erred In Denying 
His Motion In Limine To Exclude 
His Breath Test Results At Trial. ......................................... 18 
Ill. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied 
Svelmoe's Motion To Suppress The Results 
Of His Breath Test ......................................................................... 20 
A. Introduction ......................................................................... 20 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................ 20 
C. Reading The ALS Form Before Requesting 
A Breath Test Did Not Violate Svelmoe's 
Constitutional Rights ........................................................... 21 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 22 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 22 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) .................................. 17 
BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho 624, 
315 P.3d 812 (2013) ................................................................................ 16 
Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 40 P.3d 110 (2002) ................................... 18, 19 
Johnson v. State, 153 Idaho 246,280 P.3d 749 (2012) ..................................... 15 
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 181 P.3d 450 (2008) .......................... 19 
Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho 867, 
243 P.3d 1055 (2010) .................................................................. 15, 16, 17 
Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372,234 P.3d 696 (2010) ........................................ 19 
Nicodemus v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 
473 P.2d 312 (Okla. Cr. 1970) ................................................................. 10 
Pocatello Hosp. LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 
157 Idaho 732,339 P.3d 1136 (2014) ..................................................... 12 
State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008) .................... 14 
State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 136 P.3d 350 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................ 8 
State v. Bacon, 117 Idaho 679,791 P.2d 429 (1990) ........................................... 8 
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) .................... 13, 14 
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2003) ......................... 7 
State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 848 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................ 8 
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,118 P.3d 160 (Ct. App. 2005) .......................... 7, 8 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................ 6 
State v. Diaz, 117 Idaho 392,788 P.2d 207 (1990) .............................................. 6 
State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 92 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2004) ................................ 7 
iii 
State v. Gusman, 125 ldaho 805,874 P. 2d 1112 (1994) .................................. 12 
State v. Haynes,_ Idaho_, 355 P.3d 1266 (2015) ............................. passim 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003) .................................... 14 
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,148 P.3d 1240 (2006) ..................................... 20 
State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 606 P.2d 981 (1980) ........................................... 8 
State v. Riendeau,_, Idaho_, 355 P.3d 1282 (2015) ........................ passim 
State v. Ruiz, 106 Idaho 336, 678 P.2d 1109 (1984) ............................................ 6 
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................ 7 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ........................................ 11 
Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797,573 P.2d 116 (1977) .............................. passim 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) ...................................................... 8 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 1-2208(3)(d) ................................................................................................ 6 
I. C. § 18-8002A(7) .............................................................................................. 17 
I.C. § 19-1303 ....................................................................................................... 9 
I. C. § 19-1717 ....................................................................................................... 9 
I.C. § 19-3506 ................................................................................................... 8, 9 
I.C. § 67-5201(3) ................................................................................................. 15 
I.C. § 67-5231 ..................................................................................................... 16 
I.C. § 67-5270 ............................................................................................... 15, 16 
1.C. § 67-5271 ............................................................................................... 16, 17 
I.C. § 67-5272 ............................................................................................... 16, 17 
I.C. § 67-5273 .............................................................................................. 16, 17 
iv 
I.C. § 67-5278 .............................................................................................. 16, 17 
RULES 
1.A.R. 35(a)(6) ..................................................................................................... 19 
I.C.R. 2.2(b)(2) ...................................................................................................... 6 
I.C.R. 33(b) ......................................................................................................... 12 
I.C.R. 48 ................................................................................................................ 7 
I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) ................................................................................................. 15 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Troy Miles Svelmoe appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Chapman stopped Svelmoe because Svelmoe's vehicle bumper 
exceeded maximum height and his vehicle had no mud flaps. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 
24, Ls. 18-25; R., p. 10.) Earlier that same day, Officer Tetrault had responded 
to a call regarding Svelmoe. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-23; R., pp. 10-11.) At 
that time, Svelmoe admitted that he had consumed alcohol and Officer Tetrault 
told Svelmoe not to drive. (Id.) After Officer Chapman stopped Svelmoe, Officer 
Tetrault was called and conducted the DUI investigation. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 
1-6.) During the DUI investigation Officer Tetrault observed Svelmoe had the 
odor of an alcohol beverage emitting from his person, bloodshot eyes and a 
"slack appearance." (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-23.) 
Officer Tetrault conducted field sobriety tests. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 24-
25.) Svelmoe failed the HGN test and the walk-and-turn test but successfully 
completed the one-leg stand. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-17.) Officer Tetrault 
placed Svelmoe under arrest and offered Svelmoe a breath test. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 
26, L. 22 - p. 27, L. 5.) Officer Tetrault cleared Svelmoe's mouth of any foreign 
objects and observed him for fifteen minutes. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 6-9.) He 
also read Svelmoe the Administrative License Suspension Advisory (ALS) form. 
(2/11/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 10-15.) Svelmoe indicated he understood the ALS form 
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and Svelmoe provided two brea,th samples. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 27, L. 16 - p. 28, L. 
7.) Svelmoe never attempted to physically resist the test or revoke his consent. 
(2/11/15 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 8-14.) The breath samples returned a result of 0.108 and 
0.106 BAC. (R., p. 11.) 
Because he had two prior DUI convictions, the state charged Svelmoe 
with felony DUI. (R., pp. 18-19.) At the first preliminary hearing the state did not 
yet have in its possession the necessary certified documentation to introduce the 
breath test results. (R., pp. 35-36. 1) However, the state believed it could 
establish probable cause without the breath test results and proceeded to 
preliminary hearing. (Id.) The magistrate found that without the breath test 
results the state could not establish probable cause and dismissed the case. 
(Id.) 
The state refiled the felony DUI and Svelmoe filed a motion to dismiss 
claiming that the refiling was "unnecessary and unconstitutional." (R., pp. 28-
33.) Svelmoe argued his motion to dismiss at the outset of the second 
preliminary hearing. (10/31/14 Tr., p. 3, L. 3 - p. 7, L. 14.2) The magistrate 
denied the motion to dismiss, holding in part that it was the district court, not the 
magistrate, who should rule on the motion. (10/31/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 - p. 9, L. 
12.) 
1 While the first preliminary hearing is referenced in the record (R., pp. 28-33, 35-
38, 341-344; 12/19/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 10 - p. 6, L. 11), the transcript, minutes, 
orders or pleadings actually relating to the first preliminary hearing are not 
included in the record on appeal. 
2 The October 31, 2014 Transcript is found in the record on pages 250-340. 
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The state thereafter introduced Svelmoe's breath test results, and the 
magistrate found probable cause and bound the case over to district court. 
(10/31/14 Tr., p. 58, L. 3 - p. 64, L. 23, p. 87, L. 7 - p. 88, L. 10; R., pp. 39-49.) 
In district court, Svelmoe filed a motion to suppress the breath test results, a 
motion in limine to preclude use of the breath test results, a second motion to 
dismiss, and a motion for interlocutory appeal to appeal the denial of his first 
motion to dismiss before the magistrate court. (R., pp. 198-199, 200-214, 225-
233, 235-237.) The district court denied Svelmoe's motions. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 46, 
L. 13 - p. 48, L. 16, Tr., p. 58, L. 5 - p. 59, L. 25, p. 71, L. 12 - p. 72, L. 9; R., 
pp. 349-350, 385-386.) 
At trial the state laid foundation for the breath test results. Officer Tetrault 
testified that he received DUI-specific training as part of his POST-certification. 
(2/17/15 Tr., p. 96, L. 21 - p. 97, L. 16.) Officer Tetrault testified that when he 
took Svelmoe into the jail, after Svelmoe failed the FSTs, he had Svelmoe blow 
into the lntoxilyzer. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 128, Ls. 1-13.) Officer Tetrault was trained to 
use the lntoxilyzer machine. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 130, Ls. 13-12.) This training 
included a written test and a hands-on use of the lntoxilyzer machine. (2/17 /15 
Tr., p. 130, Ls. 15-19.) Officer Tetrault passed both the hands-on portion and 
the written test and is qualified to use the lntoxilyzer machine. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 
130, L. 20 - p. 131, L. 3.) Officer Tetrault received the operator's certification 
and it was current on May 9, 2014, when he tested Svelmoe. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 
131, L. 15 - p. 133, L. 14.) Officer Tetrault's certifications were admitted into 
evidence. (Id.; Ex. 2.) Officer Tetrault explained that the lntoxilyzer measures 
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alcohol levels. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 133, Ls. 17-21.) He also testified that the 
lntoxilyzer goes through a series of internal checks, calibration checks, 
temperature checks, and it prints out an indication that it has passed all of the 
internal checks. (2/17 /15 Tr., p. 134, L. 7 - p. 135, L. 18.) It also takes two air 
blanks to make sure there is no alcohol in the actual tube. (Id.) The lntoxilyzer 
has to pass all of these internal checks in order to be functioning properly. (Id.) 
It prints a result of the internal tests. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 14-22.) The state 
introduced evidence showing the lntoxilyzer serial number 68-013321 and lot 
solution number 13803 passed all of its internal tests. (Ex. 4.) The state also 
introduced evidence that lntoxilyzer serial number 68-013321 and lot solution 
number 13803 were properly certified and calibrated. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 138, Ls. 
12-17; see also Ex. 3.) Officer Tetrault testified that he monitored Svelmoe for 
fifteen minutes and made sure that Svelmoe did not burp, belch or have any 
foreign objects in his mouth. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 136, L. 23 - p. 138, L. 11.) 
Svelmoe's breath test results showed a BAC of .108 and .106. (Ex. 4.) At trial, 
the district court overruled Svelmoe's objections and admitted the breath test 
evidence. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 144, L. 13- p. 146, L. 10, p. 147, Ls. 3-14.) 
The jury found Svelmoe guilty. (R., p. 452.) Svelmoe waived a jury for 
Part II and the district court found that Svelmoe had two prior DUI convictions. 
(2/17 /15 Tr., p. 194, Ls. 2-8, p. 208, L. 14 - p. 209, L. 16.) The district court 
sentenced Svelmoe to 10 years with two years fixed. (R., pp. 455-456, 461-
463.) The district court suspended the sentence and placed Svelmoe on 
probation. (Id.) Svelmoe timely appealed. (R., pp. 467-471.) 
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ISSUES 
Svelmoe states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the Magistrate Court has the authority to consider 
whether the state has met the requirements of Stockwell v. State, 
98 Idaho 797 (1977) when the state refiles a felony charge. 
II. Whether the new evidence means additional evidence or 
requires evidence not known to the state at the time of the original 
preliminary hearing. 
Ill. Whether the state's refiling of the charge in this matter was 
barred by res judicata. 
IV. Whether the Idaho State Police have properly promulgated 
rules for the administration of breath testing. 
V. Whether the Idaho State Police have promulgated rules that 
ensure accuracy as required by I.C. § 18-8002A and I.C. § 18-
8004(4). 
VI. Whether State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d. 219 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2013), is manifestly wrong and should be overruled. 
VII. Whether the Administrative License Suspension advisory 
coerces and invalidates the defendant's consent to providing a 
breath sample under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I § 1 of the Idaho Constitution. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Svelmoe failed to show the district court erred when it denied 
his motion to dismiss? 
2. Has Svelmoe failed to show the district court erred when it denied 
his motion in limine to exclude the results of his breath test? 
3. Has Svelmoe failed to show the district court erred when it denied 




Svelmoe Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion To Dismiss The Refiled Felony 
A. Introduction 
Svelmoe argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
dismiss the refiled complaint. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-14.) Svelmoe raises 
several arguments on appeal.3 He argues the state did not have good cause to 
refile the felony and therefore, the refiling violated his due process rights. 
3 Svelmoe also argues that the magistrate erred when it ruled that it was not the 
magistrate's "province" to rule on whether the state's refile was done in good 
faith. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) This argument is moot because the 
district court ruled on Svelmoe's Motion to Dismiss Part II, which contained the 
same issues as his motion to dismiss before the magistrate. (R., pp. 28-33, 225-
234.) On appeal, it is the decision of the district court that the appellate court will 
review. See e.g. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (On appellate review of a decision rendered by a district court in its 
intermediate appellate capacity, the appellate court "directly review[s] the district 
court's decision.") Therefore whether the magistrate erred is moot. 
Regardless, the magistrate was correct when it ruled that it was not the 
magistrate's "province" to rule on Svelmoe's motion to dismiss the refiled 
Complaint. The district court can delegate to the magistrate "Proceedings for the 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause, commitment prior to trial 
or the release on bail of persons charged with criminal offenses." I.C. § 1-
2208(3)(d). The magistrate's authority is specifically limited in felony cases. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 2.2 limits the jurisdiction of magistrates to "The first 
appearance, the setting of bail, and the preliminary examination on a criminal 
complaint for a felony to determine probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or 
the release on bail of persons charged with a felony." I.C.R. 2.2(b)(2). The 
magistrate has not been assigned the power to dismiss a felony with prejudice. 
Idaho case law holds that when a magistrate dismisses a felony at a preliminary 
hearing, the state's remedy is not to appeal, but rather the state's remedy is to 
refile the felony complaint. See State v. Ruiz, 106 Idaho 336, 337-338, 678 P.2d 
1109, 1110-1111 (1984); State v. Diaz, 117 Idaho 392, 393-94, 788 P.2d 207, 
208-09 (1990). Svelmoe's argument runs afoul of this case law and authority. 
The magistrate did not err when it declined to rule on Svelmoe's motion to 
dismiss. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-12.) He also argues that the refiling was barred by res 
judicata. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14.) 
Svelmoe's arguments are without merit. The district court correctly 
applied the law to the facts in concluding the state refiled the felony charge in 
good faith and, as such, the refiling did not violate Svelmoe's due process rights. 
(2/11/15 Tr., p. 71, L. 12-p. 72, L. 9.) Nor does resjudicata bar the state from 
refiling a felony. On appeal, Svelmoe does not apply any facts to the elements 
of res judicata, nor does he cite any law that would bar the state from refiling a 
felony under res judicata. The district court properly denied his motion to 
dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. I.C.R. 48; State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304-305, 92 P.3d 551, 554-
555 (Ct. App. 2004). The standard of review applicable to constitutional issues 
such as claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, 
unless there are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Davis, 141 
Idaho 828, 841, 118 P.3d 160, 173 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Bromgard, 139 
Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 
712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Svelmoe's Motion To 
Dismiss 
1. The Felony Complaint Was Not Refiled For The Purpose Of 
Harassment, Delay or Forum-Shopping; Therefore The Refiling Did 
Not Violate Due Process 
Idaho Code§ 19-3506 provides: "An order for the dismissal of the action, 
as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same 
offense, if it is a misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony." The 
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that dismissal and refiling of charges can 
violate due process if "done for the purpose of harassment or delay or forum-
shopping .... " Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 806, 573 P.2d 116, 125 (1977). 
The Court has clarified the rule in Stockwell, however: "Stockwell requires the 
existence of bad faith to prove a per se due process violation." State v. Bacon, 
117 Idaho 679, 684, 791 P.2d 429, 434 (1990). Accord State v. Averett, 142 
Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006); Davis, 141 Idaho at 842, 
118 P.3d at 174. Thus, to establish a due process violation, "the defendant must 
show that the preaccusation delay caused substantial prejudice to the 
defendant's right to a fair trial and that the delay was a deliberate device to gain 
an advantage over the accused." Davis, 141 Idaho at 842, 118 P.3d at 174 
(citing State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 879, 606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. 
Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386, 848 P.2d 440, 444 (Ct. App. 1993)). See also, 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (defining bad faith, in the 
context of delay, to mean that the government sought delay "to gain tactical 
advantage over the accused"). 
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On appeal, Svelmoe argues that the state lacked good cause to refile the 
felony complaint (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-12.) Svelmoe argues that the state 
lacked good cause to refile because the state proceeded with the first preliminary 
hearing knowing that it would be unable to introduce the breath test evidence at 
the first preliminary hearing. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) Svelmoe argues that the 
state was required to have additional evidence that it did not know about prior to 
the first preliminary hearing before it could refile the felony. (Appellant's brief p. 
12 ("This Court should hold that the additional evidence required by the Court in 
Stockwell and the Due Process Clause is evidence that was unknown to the 
state and could not have been known through an exercise of due diligence at the 
time of the original preliminary hearing.").) 
Contrary to Svelmoe's assertion, Stockwell does not require the state to 
have "additional evidence" before refiling a criminal complaint. See Stockwell, 
98 Idaho at 803, 573 P.2d at 122 (citing I.C. §§ 19-1717, 19-1303, 19-3506). 
Svelmoe's argument focuses on the following language from Stockwell: 
While the present statutes do not make dismissal of a prosecution 
at the preliminary examination stage a bar to further prosecution for 
the same offense, this Court views critically the practice of 
'shopping' among magistrates or the repeated refiling of a charge 
until a favorable ruling is obtained. Without the production of 
additional evidence, or the existence of other good cause to 
justify a subsequent preliminary examination, such a practice 
can become a form of harassment which may violate the 
principle of fundamental due process and equal protection of 
the law, as announced by the United States Supreme Court. 
This is not to say that when new evidence becomes available 
or when the prosecutor believes in good faith that the 
magistrate committed error, the charge should not be refiled; 
but absent such circumstance, the continued refiling 
numerous times of a charge which has been dismissed by a 
magistrate is not to be desired. The facts of the instant case do 
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not approach such an offensive degree to be violative of 
fundamental fairness. Accordingly, this Court holds that petitioner is 
not entitled to a writ of prohibition, for as stated before, under 
existing statutes, dismissal of a prosecution at a preliminary 
examination is not a statutory bar to further prosecution for the 
same offense regardless of the 'judicial title' of the official sitting as 
examining magistrate. 
kt at 806, 573 P.2d at 125 (quoting Nicodemus v. District Court of Oklahoma 
County, 473 P.2d 312, 316 (Okla. Cr. 1970)) (emphasis added). Svelmoe 
argues that this quotation requires the state to discover additional, previously 
unknown evidence before the state can refile a criminal complaint. (See 
Appellant's brief p. 12.) However, this language only requires "additional" 
evidence. Stockwell, 98 Idaho at 803, 573 P.2d at 122. ("Without the production 
of additional evidence, or the existence of other good cause to justify a 
subsequent preliminary examination ... ") (emphasis added) The only reference 
to "new" evidence comes in the context of "refiling numerous times." kt 
This is not to say that when new evidence becomes available or 
when the prosecutor believes in good faith that the magistrate 
committed error, the charge should not be refiled; but absent such 
circumstance, the continued refiling numerous times of a charge 
which has been dismissed by a magistrate is not to be desired. 
Id. There is no requirement that the additional evidence be entirely new and 
previously undiscovered. The Stockwell test for finding a good faith basis for a 
refiling may be satisfied by additional evidence, not just newly discovered 
evidence. 
Further, under Stockwell the state can refile a felony even if it does not 
have any new or additional evidence. The state can refile a felony when it has a 
good faith belief that the magistrate erred in the first preliminary hearing. kt 
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Unless the refiling of a criminal complaint was done for the purpose of 
harassment, delay or forum-shopping, it is not a violation of the due process 
clause. kl at 806, 573 P.2d at 125. The prosecutor is only required to have a 
good faith belief that the magistrate erred in the first preliminary hearing before 
the prosecutor can refile and bring a second criminal complaint. kl Therefore, 
contrary to Svelmoe's argument, there is no requirement in Stockwell that the 
state discover new, previously unknown evidence before it can refile. 
The district court correctly found that the state did not refile the charge for 
an improper purpose, and that Svelmoe's motion to dismiss was not well taken in 
light of Stockwell and all of the facts. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 71, L. 12 - p. 72, L. 9.) 
The district court did not err when it denied Svelmoe's motion to dismiss. 
2. Res Judicata Is Inapplicable And Did Not Bar The State From 
Refiling The Complaint 
Svelmoe argues that the district court should have dismissed the refiled 
complaint because the doctrine of res judicata bars the state from refiling a 
criminal case. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14.) Svelmoe does not cite any cases 
that have applied res judicata to a preliminary hearing. (See id.) Nor does 
Svelmoe make an argument how his first preliminary hearing meets the three 
factors for claim preclusion or the five factors for issue preclusion. (See id.) 
Svelmoe only references the factors then makes the conclusory statement, "In 
this case, all the elements for issue preclusion are met. Thus, the state was 
barred from proceeding." (Id.) Svelmoe makes no argument. He simply makes 
a conclusory statement. Since Svelmoe does not make an argument, he has 
waived this issue on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 
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970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or 
argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.") 
Even if he had presented an argument on appeal, res judicata does not 
bar the state from refiling a criminal complaint following a dismissal after a 
preliminary hearing. As pointed out by the Idaho Supreme Court, Idaho statutes 
permit the state to refile a criminal case. See Stockwell, 98 Idaho at 803, 573 
P.2d at 122. Svelmoe does not cite any authority that the doctrine of res judicata 
trumps this authority. 
Further, Svelmoe cannot meet the elements of res judicata. Both types of 
res judicata - claim preclusion and issue preclusion - require a "final judgment" 
on the merits. See ~ Pocatello Hosp. LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, 
LLC, 157 Idaho 732, 738, 339 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2014). A magistrate's dismissal 
of a felony after a preliminary hearing is not a "final judgment." See I.C.R. 33(b) 
(district court enters final judgment of conviction or discharge). Res judicata 
also requires a "full and fair opportunity to litigate," and not just any hearing 
constitutes a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" for the purposes of res judicata. 
See,~. State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 805, 808-809, 874 P. 2d 1112, 1115-
1116 (1994) (BAC hearing did not constitute a full and fair opportunity to litigate). 
By its very nature, a preliminary hearing is not a hearing in which the parties 
have a "full and fair opportunity to litigate"; it is only a hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause to bind the case over to district court where 
there can then be a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the merits at trial. 
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Because res judicata is not a bar to refiling a criminal complaint, Svelmoe has 
failed to show any error in the denial of his motion. 
11. 
Svelmoe Failed To Show the District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion In 
Limine 
A Introduction 
Svelmoe argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
exclude the results of his breath test. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-22.) Svelmoe 
argues that State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), 
should be overruled and that the Idaho State Police (ISP) Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) for breath testing are void because they were not adopted in 
compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act (IAPA). (Id.) Notably, Svelmoe does not argue that that there 
was anything wrong with the breath test performed by Officer Tetrault; rather his 
argument is solely that the administrative procedures employed by ISP in 
adopting the SOPs were deficient. 
After Svelmoe filed his opening brief, the Idaho Supreme Court held in 
State v. Haynes, _ Idaho_, 355 P.3d 1266, 1273-1275 (2015), that the 
2013 SOPs were effectively agency "rules," but that those "rules" were void 
because ISP failed to adopt them in substantial compliance with the rulemaking 
requirements of the IAPA. Accord State v. Riendeau, _, Idaho_, 355 P.3d 
1282, 1285 (2015). Notwithstanding this authority, the state submits the district 
court's order denying Svelmoe's motion to exclude the breath test results on the 
basis that the 2013 SOPs were void must be affirmed. Because, as the 
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Supreme Court held in Haynes, ISP's creation of the SOPs was an agency 
action governed by the requirements of the IAPA, Svelmoe's exclusive means for 
challenging such action was through the judicial review provisions of the IAPA; 
he had no standing to raise, and neither the lower courts nor this Court have 
jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for 
excluding breath test results in a criminal case.4 
Even if Svelmoe's challenge is not jurisdictionally barred and the 2013 
SOPs are void, reversal is not required. Because the state could still lay 
foundation for the breath test results through expert testimony at trial, Svelmoe 
failed to show in his motion in limine that exclusion of the breath test results was 
required. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, given 
free review. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." Besaw, 155 Idaho at 140, 
4 Neither Haynes nor Reindeau addressed the jurisdictional issue. Although the 
state did not raise this argument to the trial court, it is nevertheless appropriately 
before this Court for the first time on appeal because a challenge to a court's 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731, 733 (Ct. App. 
2008). Moreover, because "[a] question of jurisdiction is fundamental[,] it cannot 
be ignored when brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be 
addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 
Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quotations and citation omitted). 
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306 P.3d at 225. 
C. The District Court And The Appellate Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction In 
This Criminal Case To Consider Svelmoe's Challenge To The Validity Of 
The 2013 SOPs 
Svelmoe argues that ISP did not approve methods for breath testing in 
compliance with the IAPA and, as a result, the methods approved by ISP are 
without effect. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-22.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently 
held as much in State v. Haynes and State v. Riendeau, supra. However, 
neither Haynes nor Riendeau addressed whether a defendant in a criminal case 
has standing to bring a challenge to the manner in which ISP approved BAC 
testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in the criminal 
case. Because, for the reasons set forth below, the judicial review provisions of 
the IAPA provide the exclusive means by which to challenge the validity of ISP's 
action, neither this Court nor the lower court have jurisdiction to entertain 
Svelmoe's challenge. 
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless 
expressly authorized by statute." Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho 
867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1)); Johnson v. 
State, 153 Idaho 246, 250, 280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 67-
5270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an 
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See 1.C. § 
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action"); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at 
1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court"). 
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final 
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agency action" must comply with the procedural requirements of I.C. §§ 67-5271 
through 67-5279. I.C. § 67-5270(2); BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho 
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 
1058. Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a rule, 
compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to obtain judicial review 
requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all available administrative 
remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or declaratory 
judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which the final 
agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (1.C. § 67-
5272(1 )), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being 
challenged (I.C. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the 
action (I.C. § 67-5278). Svelmoe did not comply with any of these procedural 
requirements, nor could he ever have done so in the criminal case. 
From the beginning of this case, Svelmoe has sought a judicial ruling 
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied 
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing 
methods contained in the SOPs. But Svelmoe did not comply with the judicial 
review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, he did not attempt to 
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pursue any available administrative remedies. 5 I.C. § 67-5271. Nor did he 
"institute" any "proceedings for review or declaratory judgment" by filing a timely 
petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming ISP as a party 
to the action. I.C. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278. Instead, Svelmoe has 
attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding his breath test 
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including 
I.C. § 18-8004, enables Svelmoe to challenge the validity of ISP's action in this 
forum and in this manner. Svelmoe's attempt to do so is, in his own words, 
nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of 
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.18.) 
Because there is no statute that authorizes Svelmoe to raise ISP's alleged 
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a defense in the 
criminal case, Svelmoe lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower 
court and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it. See Laughy, 149 
5 The state confesses that it is not aware of any specific administrative remedy 
by which Svelmoe could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and 
methods for BAC testing contained therein. Although I.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows 
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been 
suspended as a result of failing a BAC test, failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAC testing is 
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In 
addition, I.C. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency 
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the 
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco, Inc. v. State, 
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state 
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA). 
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Idaho at 870, 243 P .3d at 1058 ("Without an enabling statute, the district court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.). Because the IAPA 
applies to ISP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, see Haynes, _ 
Idaho _, 355 P.3d at 1273-1275, it also applies to bar Svelmoe's attempt to 
challenge those actions in this criminal case. 
D. Even If The 2013 SOPs Are Void, Svelmoe Has Failed To Show The 
District Court Erred In Denying His Motion In Limine To Exclude His 
Breath Test Results At Trial 
Even if the 2013 SOPs were void, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Svelmoe's motion in limine to exclude his breath test 
results at trial. On appeal, Svelmoe argues, "The District Court erred in not 
granting the defendant's motion in limine to exclude the breath testing." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.6) Svelmoe's motion in limine, and appeal, only argued 
the state could not show 'the breath test was administered in conformity with 
applicable test procedures because the test procedures were void. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 14-22; R., pp. 200-214.) However, there are two ways the 
state can lay foundation to introduce the breath test results. See Haynes, _ 
Idaho_, 355 P.3d at 1275 (citing Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757, 40 P.3d 
110, 115 (2002)). The state can either show that the test was administered in 
conformity with applicable test procedures or expert testimony may suffice to 
6 At trial, Svelmoe objected to the introduction of the breath test and the district 
court overruled those objections. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 144, L. 13 - p. 146, L. 10, p. 
147, Ls. 3-14.) However, on appeal Svelmoe does not challenge the district 
court's trial ruling, but instead only challenges the district court's pre-trial motion 
in limine ruling. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 14-22.) 
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establish an adequate foundation. See kl (citing Dach let, 136 Idaho at 757, 40 
P.3d at 115. 
In Haynes, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that, even if the ISP 
SOPs were invalid, the district court did not err in denying the motion in limine 
because it was possible for the state to lay foundation for the admission of the 
breath test results through the use of expert testimony. kl 
Therefore, the fact that the 2013 SOPs are void would not have 
prevented the State from establishing an adequate foundation for 
the admissibility of the test results. As stated above, the magistrate 
court ruled that the State would have to establish that the test was 
accurate. That could be done by expert testimony. Because Ms. 
Haynes pied guilty prior to trial, the magistrate court never had to 
determine whether the State could present sufficient evidence to 
establish that foundation. The district court did not err in holding 
that the magistrate did not err in denying the motion in limine. 
Id.; accord Riendeau, Idaho , 355 P.3d at 1285. - - -
In this case, Svelmoe went to trial and, at that trial, the state laid 
foundation for the admission of Svelmoe's breath test results through the 
testimony of Officer Tetrault. (2/17/15 Tr., p. 128, L. 10 - p. 148, L. 3; Exs. 2, 3, 
4.) On appeal Svelmoe does not challenge the district court's trial ruling that 
admitted the breath test results over his foundation objections, but instead only 
challenges the district court's pre-trial motion in limine ruling. (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-22.) Idaho appellate courts will not consider an issue not supported 
by argument and authority in the opening brief. See Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 
372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); (citing Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 
524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); I.AR. 35(a)(6).) The only issue before this 
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court is whether the district court erred in denying the motion in limine. The 
holding in Haynes dictates that it did not. 
111. 
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Svelmoe's Motion To Suppress 
The Results Of His Breath Test 
A. Introduction 
Svelmoe argues the district court should have suppressed evidence of his 
breath test because his consent to the test was not voluntary. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 23-27.) Svelmoe claims that when a defendant is advised of the ALS 
suspension any subsequent consent is involuntary. (Id.) Svelmoe's argument is 
foreclosed by the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Haynes, which held that 
requesting a breath test "was not an unreasonable search" and therefore 
consent, as an exception to the warrant requirement, does not apply. See 
Haynes,_ Idaho_, 355 P.3d at 1275 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
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C. Reading The ALS Form Before Requesting A Breath Test Did Not Violate 
Svelmoe's Constitutional Rights 
Svelmoe argues that advising a defendant of the ALS penalties vitiates 
any consent they may give to the breath test. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-27.) 
Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. See Haynes, _ Idaho _, 
355 P.3d at 1275-1276. In Haynes, the Idaho Supreme Court held that where 
the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a person was operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a breath test "was not an unreasonable 
search" and therefore consent, as an exception to the warrant requirement, does 
not apply . .kL see also Riendeau, _, Idaho _, 355 P.3d at 1285. Here, 
Svelmoe admitted that he had been drinking. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-23; R., 
pp. 10-11.) In an encounter earlier in the day, before he was pulled over, Officer 
Tetrault told Svelmoe not to drive. (Id.) Officer Tetrault observed Svelmoe had 
the odor of an alcohol beverage emitting from his person, bloodshot eyes and 
slack appearance. (2/11/15 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 12-23.) Svelmoe failed the HGN test 
and the walk-and-turn test but successfully completed the one-leg stand. 
(2/11/15 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-17.) Officer Tetrault had reasonable grounds to believe 
Svelmoe was operating the motor vehicle while he was under the influence of 
alcohol. Therefore, requesting Svelmoe perform a breath test was not an 
unreasonable search, and no exception to the warrant requirement is required. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
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